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Ticien Marie Sassoubre
In 2014, video images of Michael Brown’s body lying in the street in Ferguson, 
Eric Garner dying in a chokehold, and the shooting of twelve-year-old Tamir 
Rice prompted a national conversation about law enforcement and race. Video 
technology was widely heralded as holding the promise of both proving and 
deterring police misconduct. The same year, the Supreme Court dismissed a 
wrongful death lawsuit on the ground that video captured by cameras mounted 
on police vehicles conclusively established the reasonableness of an officer’s 
use of deadly force.1 This coincidence disclosed a troubling contradiction. On 
the one hand, the ubiquity of camera phones and various forms of surveillance 
video seemed to hold the promise of injecting “reality” into legal processes 
in a way that would protect minorities and safeguard civil rights. On the 
other, the ubiquity of camera phones and various forms of surveillance video 
threatened to render unnecessary the very trials protestors were calling for by 
offering judges apparently objective knowledge about disputed events. The 
authority the image enjoys in our national media had finally breached legal 
discourse’s long-standing resistance to that authority.2 And the breach had 
exposed the incoherence of legal engagements with visual culture.3 I couldn’t 
imagine teaching my law and film class in the usual way anymore. It was time 
to develop a course in visual literacy for lawyers.4
My first task was to try to understand what, if anything, had changed. After 
all, though much is made of the multimodal nature of our twenty-first-century 
1. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014). The opinion extended a similar holding in Scott v. 
Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
2. See Elizabeth G. Porter, Taking Images Seriously, 114 Colum. l. Rev. 1687, 1723-49 (2014). On 
the cultural authority of the image, see for example, GettinG the PiCtuRe: the visual 
CultuRe of the news (Jason E. Hill & Vanessa R. Schwartz eds., 2015); miles oRvell, the 
Real thinG: imitation and authentiCity in ameRiCan CultuRe, 1880-1940 (1989).
3. On the oscillating legal treatment of photographs and other visual representations in the late 
nineteenth century, see Jennifer Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power 
of Analogy, 10 Yale J.l. & human. 1 (1998). Jessica M. Silbey documents the inconsistency 
of the legal treatment of filmic images in the twentieth century in Judges as Film Critics: New 
Approaches to Filmic Evidence, 37 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 493 (2004).
4. I was by no means first to come to this conclusion. See Richard K. Sherwin, Neal Feigenson 
& Christina Spiesel, Law in the Digital Age: How Visual Communication Technologies are Transforming the 
Practice, Theory, and Teaching of Law, 12 B.u. J. sCi. & teCh. L. 227 (2006). 
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digital media, newspapers and magazines were already multimodal—in the sense 
of combining words and images—by the late nineteenth century.5 And while 
early-nineteenth-century Americans gauged truth by a claim’s reasonableness, 
by the end of the nineteenth century, Americans already tended to believe 
that what they saw “in a photograph was true—from the finish of a horse race 
to the nebulae in the sky.”6 By the mid-twentieth century, video had largely 
supplanted the photograph as the standard for objective representations of 
reality, as proof. Evidence and trial advocacy have been grappling with the 
technological and cultural development of visual representation for more than 
a century.
Nevertheless, law has until very recently continued to treat visual 
representations as ancillary to facts, not as facts in and of themselves. 
Legal persuasion has remained the province of language, tested by reason. 
And judges have reinforced this hierarchy in their encounters with images. 
Since digital cameras and the Internet combined to render our experience 
of the world more or less always visually represented and, for the most part, 
instantaneously publishable, our expectations of what can be caught on 
camera are certainly greatly expanded. But that doesn’t explain why visual 
representations are suddenly making their way into areas like contracts,7 or 
why design thinking is now affecting the way legal products (and services) 
look.8 If something has changed, the difference is not so much the technology 
as the transformation of our cultural norms of persuasion.
It became clear to me that a course in visual literacy for lawyers would have 
to respond to the broad field of visual representational practices that today 
constitute effective persuasion. But I encountered an immediate difficulty 
in pinning down just what “visual literacy,” broadly conceived, might be. As 
art historian James Elkins reminds us, at a basic level, “visual literacy” “can’t 
possibly mean anything. If it did mean something, then we would be able to 
read images, to parse them like writing, to read them aloud, to decode them 
and translate them.”9 Obviously, we can’t.
And while the humanities have long experience with visual representation, 
images defy precisely the kind of reduction that general competency would 
require. There is no single authoritative account of what to see when you look 
5. See James elkins, visual studies: a skePtiCal intRoduCtion 129-36 (2003).
6. william m. ivins, JR., PRints and visual CommuniCation 94 (1953).
7. See Jay Mitchell, Whiteboard and Black-Letter: Visual Communication in Commercial Contracts, 20 u. Pa. 
J. Bus. l. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3057075; 
Elizabeth G. Porter & Kathryn A. Watts, Visual Rulemaking, 91 n.y.u. l. Rev. 1183 (2016). 
8. See, e.g., leGal desiGn laB at stanfoRd, http://www.legaltechdesign.com.
9. See elkins, supra note 5, at 128. Neuroscience has begun to provide us with a physiological 
explanation for the difference between the way we “read” images and words. See, e.g., 
BenJamin k. BeRGen, loudeR than woRds: the new sCienCe of how the mind makes 
meaninG (2012). 
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at an image, or even how to make sense of what you perceive.10 Interdisciplinary 
borrowing amounts to choosing between overlapping, competing, and 
contested interpretive theories.11 The fact that so much of our persuasive 
communication today is multimodal only exacerbates the problem. Not only 
is there no one rubric for decoding what images mean on their own, but there 
is no one rubric for decoding the meaning of words and images or graphics 
working together.12 
Elkins proposes an alternate approach to visual culture that reflects both 
the enormous range of images we encounter and the specificity of each image.13 
Rather than thinking about visual literacy in terms of an interpretive tool kit, 
he suggests that visual literacy involves acquiring competence in a variety of 
representational practices, like the making of photographic and digital images 
and special effects, graphic design and architectural drafting, and the various 
representational practices employed in the sciences.14
This approach strikes me as especially useful for thinking about law and 
visual culture because it acknowledges the diversity of images we encounter in 
legal discourse (e.g., MRIs, surveillance videos, statistical graphs, blueprints, 
CGI reproductions of accident scenes). Indeed, Jennifer Mnookin has recently 
begun to explore the legal treatment of what she calls “semi-legible” images—
images that require technical competence to decipher, or offer information 
that is partial and/or ambiguous.15 The increasing occurrence of visual 
representations in legal discourse will only amplify the challenge of engaging 
with those representations competently.16
Visual images are made and viewed in particular historical and cultural 
contexts, embedded in particular fields of knowledge, and produced in 
dialogue with particular conventions. The version of visual literacy for 
lawyers that Elkins’ approach suggests requires attention to how an image was 
produced, what the image was produced for, and the kind of expertise that is 
10. The list of possible citations here makes the case. See the PhotoGRaPhy ReadeR: histoRy 
and theoRy (Liz Wells ed., 2d. ed. 2002); film theoRy and CRitiCism (Leo Braudy & 
Marshall Cohen eds., 6th ed. 2004). 
11. See the visual CultuRe ReadeR (Nicholas Mirzoeff ed., 2d ed. 1998); visual CultuRe: the 
ReadeR (Jessica Evans & Stuart Hall eds., 1999). Much of the work in the field assumes a 
familiarity with continental theory, which can make it challenging for the uninitiated.
12. John A. Bateman offers a relatively accessible survey of the field in multimodality and 
GenRe: a foundation foR the systematiC analysis of multimodal doCuments (2008). 
13. See elkins, supra note 5, at 142-94; see also JennifeR Roswell, woRkinG with multimodality: 
RethinkinG liteRaCy in a diGital aGe (2013).
14. elkins, supra note 5, 140-87. On the visual culture of the sciences, see visual CultuRes of 
sCienCe: RethinkinG RePResentational PRaCtiCes in knowledGe BuildinG and sCienCe 
CommuniCation (Luc Pauwels ed., 2006).
15. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Semi-Legibility and Visual Evidence: An Initial Exploration, 10 law, CultuRe 
and the humanities 43 (2014).
16. As Elkins insists, the fact that visual culture is familiar does not mean that the study of visual 
culture should be easy. elkins, supra note 5, at 65.
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required or assumed in order to “read” it (for example, a surgeon will defer 
to a radiologist’s reading of a CT scan). It also requires attention to what’s 
missing in the image—what is outside the frame of the surveillance camera, 
the data that have not been plotted. So I designed a course that would train 
students to ask the right kinds of questions about the knowledge particular 
images variously create, organize, represent, assume, require, and deny.
Learning to ask the right kinds of questions means practicing on a wide 
range of images. I start with famous historical photographs: Eadweard 
Muybridge’s galloping horse, Edward Curtis’s images of Native Americans, 
Dorothea Lange’s Migrant Mother. These pictures helped establish the language 
of photographic realism we have inherited. They are also distant enough from 
our experience that it is easier to notice the details that we use to decide what 
they mean (the curled fist of a child, the frayed hem on a sleeve). Then the 
class turns to images that are trending at the moment. These have ranged 
from wedding pictures released by Kanye West and Kim Kardashian West 
to the 2016 photograph of the five-year-old Syrian boy Omran Daqneesh 
in an ambulance. We talk about how to assess the veracity or authenticity 
of these photographs (affect, access, details), the conventions and cultural 
narratives they invoke or resist, the formal elements that affect our impressions 
(cropping, color, the interplay of image and text), the persuasive or ideological 
work particular photographs seem to lend themselves to, and the persuasive or 
ideological liabilities particular photographs seem to carry.
Next we turn to the way moving pictures are shot and edited. I start by 
contrasting early films shot in long takes from a single fixed camera with scenes 
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from D.W. Griffith’s Birth of a Nation (1915), in which the practice of montage 
takes its modern form. Montage is the editing together of separate, juxtaposed 
shots to create an overarching sense of unity or coherence.17 It is montage 
that creates the impression of the omnipresence of the camera, which in turn 
contributes to the problem of naïve realism.18 Rather than identify with the 
human actors in the frame, montage editing invites the viewer to identify with 
the camera. The result is an artificial sense of expertise. The strangeness of 
these early films helps students recognize editing practices now so familiar that 
we fail to notice them. But we have to notice them, because the conventions of 
these editing practices have become our standard for realism. I then contrast a 
recent TV or movie scene in which the apparent realism and emotional stakes 
of montage editing are particularly evident, with examples from hand-held 
cameras and contemporary versions of the long take.19
This prepares us to view early-twentieth-century newsreels, recent bodycam, 
dashcam, and surveillance video, and “day in the life of” videos produced 
in personal injury and wrongful death cases. It also informs our viewing of 
footage from the Nuremberg trials. Not only did filmic evidence of atrocities 
play a central role in the Nuremberg prosecution, but Robert Jackson insisted 
that the trials themselves be filmed as evidence of their authority and integrity.20 
I assign a wide range of background readings to support these conversations, 
including photograph and film theory; legal opinions evaluating claims 
of censorship, the admissibility of photographs and moving pictures, and 
cameras in the courtroom; and relevant law review articles. 
Graphic images are next. We begin with airport signs and apparently 
straightforward diagrams (an electrical circuit, an organizational chart) before 
we tackle graphics depicting phenomena like MTBE contamination plumes,21 
natural gas pipeline construction, and traumatic brain injuries. Again, here, 
I tend to pull from current events and high-profile cases; a wide range of 
images is readily available online. Background reading for these sessions 
includes texts on graphic design and Edward Tufte’s chilling account of the 
way Boeing engineers’ use of generic PowerPoint templates contributed to the 
17. “A montage sequence serves a very useful purpose by condensing important plot points and 
developments . . . into a shorter, more manageable duration. The audience does not have 
to watch every aspect of these events to understand their results.” ChRistoPheR J. Bowen & 
Roy thomPson, the GRammaR of the edit 106 (3d ed. 2013).
18. See david BoRdwell, Classical Hollywood Cinema: Narrational Principles and Procedures, in naRRative, 
aPPaRatus, ideoloGy 24 (Philip Rosen ed., 1986). 
19. I use a scene from the second episode of Season One of the HBO series The Wire (2002) as 
the montage example. For the long take, I use a scene from Episode Four of the first season 
of True Detective (2014) and a scene from BiRdman (2014).
20. See ChRistian delaGe, CauGht on CameRa: film in the CouRtRoom fRom the nuRemBeRG 
tRials to the tRials of the khmeR RouGe (Ralph Schoolcraft & Mary Byrd Kelly eds., 
2013).
21. MTBE (methyl tertiary-butyl ether) is a gasoline additive whose seepage into drinking water 
is known to have dangerous health consequences.
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2003 Columbia Space Shuttle disaster by suggesting misleading relationships 
between findings.22 As in our conversations about photographic and filmic 
images, we focus on the way form creates meaning (color, font size, shape, 
relative location, empty spaces, implied connections). I also invite lawyers 
from both trial and corporate practice to talk about the use of visual products 
they (and others) create.23
Starting the course with a survey of visual representational forms eases 
students into a sense of the range of competencies that their practice might 
require. And students quickly recognize that background knowledge of social 
practices, stereotypes, and familiar cultural narratives is necessary to make 
sense of almost any particular image.24 This recognition effectively pierces the 
naïve realism—mistaking the mediated, produced representation for a source 
of objective facts or direct experience of events—embodied in the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of dashboard camera video in Scott and Plumhoff.25 It also 
helps students grasp the deeper lesson of naïve realism: Not only do people 
tend to believe that “their own perceptions and interpretations are essentially 
free of distortion,” but “differences in subjective interpretation . . . have a 
profound impact on the conduct of everyday social affairs.”26
The rest of the course explores this interaction between our subjective 
experience of images and the law. I assign psychological studies demonstrating 
that social stereotypes and categories influence the way “perceivers come to 
organize and structure the visual stimuli to which they are exposed.”27 For 
example, a police officer may be quicker to “see” an indistinct object as a gun 
if he has just seen a black face. These “empirical demonstrations of social 
influences on vision”28 inform our discussion of the outcomes in California v. 
Powell (in which a police officer was acquitted despite video of his role in the 
22. edwaRd R. tufte, the CoGnitive style of PoweRPoint: PitChinG out CoRRuPts within 
(2d. ed. 2006). 
23. Guest speakers have included my colleague Jay Mitchell, author of Picturing Corporate 
Practice (2016), and Chris Ritter, author of several books on trial graphics and strategies. 
http://www.thefocalpoint.com/about/team/christopher-ritter.
24. This aspect of visual literacy is related to the importance of cultural literacy for lawyers 
emphasized by several authors in this symposium. See generally law’s stoRies: naRRative and 
RhetoRiC in the law (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996); anthony G. amsteRdam & 
JeRome s. BRuneR, mindinG the law (2000). 
25. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014). On naïve realism in these cases, see Dan M. 
Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 
122 haRv. l. Rev. 837 (2009); Naomi Mezey, The Image Cannot Speak for Itself: Film, Summary 
Judgment, and Visual Literacy, 48 val. u. l. Rev. 1 (2013); Jessica Silbey, Evidence Verité and the Law 
of Film, 31 CaRdozo l. Rev. 1257 (2010). 
26. Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social Conflict and 
Misunderstanding, in values and knowledGe 117, 104 (Edward S. Reed, Elliot Turiel, 
& Terrance Brown eds., 1996). 
27. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PeRs. soC. 
PsyCh. 876, 878 (2004). 
28. Id. at 877.
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brutal beating of Rodney King) and The People v. Orenthal James Simpson (in which 
Simpson was acquitted to the surprise of many who had watched the trial on 
TV), as well as recent decisions by grand juries not to indict officers where 
there has been video evidence of lethal violence against black men. They also 
invite us to consider the way the representation of race, class, gender, and 
sexual orientation in our visual culture shapes what will constitute effective 
persuasion.
Indeed, W.J.T. Mitchell argues compellingly that visual representations 
generally, while “not reducible to language,” are nevertheless “as important as 
language in mediating social relations.”29 On Mitchell’s account, the images 
and practices that comprise our visual culture act as “‘go-betweens’ in social 
transactions, as a repertoire of screen images or templates that structure our 
encounters with other human beings.”30 In other words, the stereotypes, 
expectations, and stock stories we use to make sense of what we see now come 
to us largely through our visual culture. We employ the same practices of 
“everyday seeing” whether we are browsing through a magazine, viewing a 
Facebook news feed, choosing whom to ask for directions on the street, or 
evaluating surveillance video footage.31
A police officer does not see differently in his capacity as an officer of the 
law than he does when he is playing a video game or watching CNN. Nor 
does a client. Or a judge. As I have argued elsewhere, there is something 
inherently cinematic about the way Justice Alito (verbally) describes the 
police pursuit of Rickard’s vehicle in Plumhoff.32 Justice Alito splices together 
images from three cruiser-mounted cameras to create a single account. And 
this single account—stripped of the ambiguity generated by multiple, limited 
viewpoints—forecloses the possibility of reasonable disagreement about the 
facts. Remarkably, Justice Alito is practicing the conventions of film editing 
at the same time he is mistaking film for reality.33 But it is unremarkable that 
he describes what he sees by practicing montage editing, because montage 
editing has become a reflexive way of describing what we see—a mode of 
everyday seeing.
All of this has me convinced that sensitizing lawyers to the ways our visual 
culture informs legal analysis and the construction of social facts is an essential 
part of what visual literacy for lawyers must mean. So we read and discuss 
cases from areas of law where visual culture looms large: privacy, national 
security, pornography.34 By this point in the course, students easily recognize 
29. w.J.t mitChell, what do PiCtuRes want? the lives and loves of imaGes 47 (2005).
30. Id. at 351.
31. Id. at 351, 356. 
32. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014); see Ticien Sassoubre, Knowing It When We See It: 
Realism, Melodrama, and the Epistemology of American Film, in tRial films on tRial (Austin Sarat et 
al. eds., 2018).
33. mitChell, supra note 29, at 356.
34. In this part of the course we also discuss Errol Morris’s standaRd oPeRatinG PRoCeduRe 
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the inconsistency of the treatment of images in different legal contexts.35 
Sometimes images are treated as unmediated and objective; sometimes they 
are treated as inherently manipulative; sometimes they are treated as revealing 
the intentions of the people who made them;36 sometimes two otherwise 
indistinguishable images are treated differently based on what a viewer believes 
about an invisible difference in the actual age of the participants.37 Some of the 
inconsistency is related to differences in the way distinct doctrinal areas of 
law have historically interacted with visual representations: First Amendment 
claims ask different questions of video than Fourth Amendment claims; 
PowerPoint slides depicting a red plume of MTBE contamination are much 
less likely to be deemed prejudicial than graphic photographs of an accident 
victim’s injuries. Some of the inconsistency is related to the near absence 
of official guidelines.38 On one level, this inconsistency bears out Elkins’ 
insistence on the diversity and specificity of images. But for our purposes, 
this part of the class demonstrates the way the conventions, assumptions, 
expectations, and practices we take for granted in our visual culture both drive 
and limit legal discourse. Instead of treating visual culture as ancillary to the 
social reality that is the province of law, lawyers need to understand that visual 
culture already permeates legal discourse, though in ways that we are unused 
to noticing.
Not only do visual representations that seem obvious or natural to us 
comprise the lens through which legal writers describe social facts, but images 
are present at the level of metaphor. Privacy is protected in a “penumbra” of 
the First Amendment;39 “the eye of vigilance perceives the risk of damage” in 
negligence cases;40 the list of such examples would be long. And our visual 
culture informs legal analysis at an even deeper level through the analogic 
structure of most legal reasoning.41 In Riley v. California, the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment analysis turned on whether looking at the digital information on 
(2008); Seymour Hersh’s reporting on Abu Ghraib; privacy in the context of data collection 
by social media platforms as well as the government; and Catharine MacKinnon, only 
woRds (1993). 
35. This incoherence has been well-documented. See mnookin, supra note 3; silBey, supra note 3; 
PoRteR, supra note 2. 
36. Four Navy Seals v. Associated Press, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (S.D. Cal. 2005).
37. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008).
38. The few exceptions reveal just how rudimentary existing guidelines are. As an example, 
I assign Effective Use of Courtroom Technology: A Judge’s Guide to Pretrial and Trial, 
National Institute for Trial Advocacy (2001), https://public.resource.org/scribd/8763731.
pdf. 
39. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
40. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928).
41. On the analogic nature of legal reasoning, see Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, 
Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 haRv. l. Rev. 923 (1996). 
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a person’s cell phone is like looking in a physical container.42 In Citizens United v. 
FEC, Justice Kennedy reasoned that if a movie made by a corporation looks like 
a movie made by Frank Capra, both movies are the same kind of (protected) 
speech, and a corporation must therefore be the same kind of (protected) 
speaker as a person.43 Legal persuasion and visual culture converge where we 
reason through our habits of everyday seeing.
This year I have added two elements to the course. The first takes into 
account the effect that virtual reality and augmented reality will have on both 
our representational practices and our expectations for realism.44 The second 
responds to the ascendance of something we might call information culture or 
big data in our understanding of social reality.45 Visual forms (charts, graphs, 
tables) are being adapted to represent them, but information cultures’ tools—
statistics, probabilities, algorithms—are mathematical. Their operation is 
invisible until it is converted into visual form. The kind of “truth” that big data 
promises may soon supplant the authority of the image in our culture. But this 
kind of “truth” is not necessarily persuasive in the same way that an image is: 
A photograph invites viewers to experience vicarious expertise; a graph of the 
average efficiency gap resulting from different voting district plans does not.46 
As big data increasingly influences our visual culture, lawyers and judges will 
have to become competent in assessing and employing “facts” and arguments 
that rely on that data as it is visually rendered.
42. The Court decided that these were not the same kind of looking. Riley v. California, 134 S. 
Ct. 2473 (2014). 
43. Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). The theory of corporate 
personhood has a long and complicated history, and the holding in Citizens United has 
been criticized on other grounds. My point is to draw attention to the significance of Justice 
Kennedy’s facile reliance on visual similarity. Individuals and corporations are alike, on the 
Court’s account, because the speech of corporations and the speech of individuals share the 
same media.
44. See, for example, the work of the Stanford Virtual Human Interaction Lab, https://vhil.
stanford.edu.
45. Here I am following Laura Marks’s suggestion that “information culture, which is invisible,” 
has already supplanted popular culture in important ways. elkins, supra note 5, at 136; see also 
lauRa u. maRks, touCh: sensuous theoRy and multisensoRy media (2002); ed finn, 
what alGoRithms want: imaGination in the aGe of ComPutinG (2017). 
46. A redistricting case before the Court from the just-completed term offers an example. See 
Brief for Appellees at 15, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2017).
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from Gill v. Whitford
Visual Persuasion for Lawyers
